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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The importance of epistemic intentions in ascription of responsibility.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Kovacevic, K. M; Bonalumi, F.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Scientific Reports, 14(1): 1183. 2024.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{kovacevic2024importance,\n\ttitle={The importance of epistemic intentions in ascription of responsibility},\n\tauthor={Kovacevic, Katarina M and Bonalumi, Francesca and Heintz, Christophe},\n\tjournal={Scientific Reports},\n\tvolume={14},\n\tnumber={1},\n\tpages={1183},\n\tyear={2024},\n\tdoi={https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-50961-0},\n\tpublisher={Nature Publishing Group UK London},\n\turl_pdf={https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-023-50961-0.pdf},\n\tkeywords={moral cognition},\n\tabstract={We investigate how people ascribe responsibility to an agent who caused a bad outcome but did not know he would. The psychological processes for making such judgments, we argue, involve finding a counterfactual in which some minimally benevolent intention initiates a course of events that leads to a better outcome than the actual one. We hypothesize that such counterfactuals can include, when relevant, epistemic intentions. With four vignette studies, we show that people consider epistemic intentions when ascribing responsibility for a bad outcome. We further investigate which epistemic intentions people are likely to consider when building counterfactuals for responsibility ascription. We find that, when an agent did not predict a bad outcome, people ascribe responsibility depending on the reasons behind the agents? lack of knowledge. People judge agents responsible for the bad outcome they caused when they could have easily predicted the consequences of their actions but did not care to acquire the relevant information. However, when this information was hard to acquire, people are less likely to judge them responsible.}\n}\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Animal Communication in Linguistic and Cognitive Perspective.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Scott-Phillips, T.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Annual Review of Linguistics, 9(1): 93-111. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Animal$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{Scott-Phillips2023,\n\tauthor = {Scott-Phillips, Thom and Heintz, Christophe},\n\ttitle = {Animal Communication in Linguistic and Cognitive Perspective},\n\tjournal = {Annual Review of Linguistics},\n\tvolume = {9},\n\tnumber = {1},\n\tpages = {93-111},\n\tyear = {2023},\n\tdoi = {10.1146/annurev-linguistics-030421-061233},\n\tkeywords={communication},\n\turl = {https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-linguistics-030421-061233},\n\tabstract = { Detailed comparative studies have revealed many surface similarities between linguistic communication and the communication of nonhumans. How should we interpret these discoveries in linguistic and cognitive perspective? We review the literature with a specific focus on analogy (similar features and function but not shared ancestry) and homology (shared ancestry). We conclude that combinatorial features of animal communication are analogous but not homologous to natural language. Homologies are found instead in cognitive capacities of attention manipulation, which are enriched in humans, making possible many distinctive forms of communication, including language use. We therefore present a new, graded taxonomy of means of attention manipulation, including a new class we call Ladyginian, which is related to but slightly broader than the more familiar class of Gricean interaction. Only in the latter do actors have the goal of revealing specifically informative intentions. Great ape interaction may be best characterized as Ladyginian but not Gricean. }\n}\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Great ape interaction: Ladyginian but not Gricean.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Scott-Phillips, T.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 120(42): e2300243120. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{scott2023great,\n\ttitle={Great ape interaction: Ladyginian but not Gricean},\n\tauthor={Scott-Phillips, Thom and Heintz, Christophe},\n\tjournal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},\n\tvolume={120},\n\tnumber={42},\n\tpages={e2300243120},\n\tyear={2023},\n\tpublisher={National Acad Sciences},\n\tkeywords={communication},\n\tabstract={Nonhuman great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences, most obviously the enormous range and scope of human expression. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. Here, we make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a ?special case of? framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. We hence describe how the attested tendencies of great ape interaction?for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than ?displaced,? and to have a high degree of perceptual resemblance between form and meaning?are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. We also reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and we distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie not in gradual changes in communication systems, but rather in gradual changes in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species? cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans,language ready.},\n\tdoi={https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.230024312}\n}\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Not by intuitions alone: Institutions shape our ownership behaviour.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Blazsek, R.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 46: e329. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{blazsek_heintz_2023, \n\ttitle={Not by intuitions alone: Institutions shape our ownership behaviour}, \n\tvolume={46}, \n\tDOI={10.1017/S0140525X23001474},\n\tjournal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, \n\tpublisher={Cambridge University Press}, author={Blazsek, Reka and Heintz, Christophe}, \n\tyear={2023}, pages={e329},\n\tabstract={Every day, people make decisions about who owns what. What cognitive processes produce this? The target article emphasises the role of biologically evolved intuitions about competition and cooperation. We elaborate the role of cultural evolutionary processes for solving coordination problems. A model based fully on biological evolution misses important insights for explaining the arbitrariness and historical contingency in ownership beliefs.}\n}\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Communication and deniability: Moral and epistemic reactions to denials.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bonalumi, F.; Bumin, F. B.; Scott-Phillips, T.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Frontiers in Psychology. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Communication$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{bonalumi2022communication,\n\ttitle={Communication and deniability: Moral and epistemic reactions to denials},\n\tauthor={Bonalumi, Francesca and Bumin, Feride Belma and Scott-Phillips, Thom and Heintz, Christophe},\n\tyear={2023},\n\tjournal={Frontiers in Psychology},\n\tpublisher={Frontiers},\n\tdoi={https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1073213},\n\turl_pdf={https://psyarxiv.com/rhsyk/download/?format=pdf},\n\tkeywords={communication},\n\tabstract={People often deny having meant what the audience understood. Such denials occur in both interpersonal and institutional contexts, such as in political discourse, the interpretation of laws and the perception of lies. In practice, denials have a wide range of possible effects on the audience, such as conversational repair, reinterpretation of the original utterance, moral judgements about the speaker, and rejection of the denial. When are these different reactions triggered? What factors make denials credible? There are surprisingly few experimental studies directly targeting such questions. Here, we present two pre-registered experiments focusing on (i) the speaker?s incentives to mislead their audience, and (ii) the impact of speaker denials on audiences? moral and epistemic assessments of what has been said. We find that the extent to which speakers are judged responsible for the audience?s interpretations is modulated by their (the speakers?) incentives to mislead, but not by denials themselves. We also find that people are more willing than we expected to revise their interpretation of the speaker?s utterance when they learn that the ascribed meaning is false, regardless of whether the speaker is known to have had incentives to deceive their audience. In general, these findings are consistent with the idea that communicators are held responsible for the cognitive effects they trigger in their audience; rather than being responsible for, more narrowly, only the effects of what was ?literally? said. In light of our findings, we present a new, cognitive analysis of how audiences react to denials, drawing in particular on the Relevance Theory approach to communication. We distinguish in particular: (a) the spontaneous and intuitive re-interpretation of the original utterance in light of a denial; (b) the attribution of responsibility to the speaker for the cognitive effects of what is communicated; and (c) the reflective attribution of a particular intention to the speaker, which include argumentative considerations, higher-order deniability and reputational concerns. Existing experimental work, including our own, aims mostly\tat (a) and (b), and does not adequately control for (c). Deeper understanding of what can be credibly denied will be hindered unless and until this methodological problem is resolved.}\n}\n\n\n

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\n People often deny having meant what the audience understood. Such denials occur in both interpersonal and institutional contexts, such as in political discourse, the interpretation of laws and the perception of lies. In practice, denials have a wide range of possible effects on the audience, such as conversational repair, reinterpretation of the original utterance, moral judgements about the speaker, and rejection of the denial. When are these different reactions triggered? What factors make denials credible? There are surprisingly few experimental studies directly targeting such questions. Here, we present two pre-registered experiments focusing on (i) the speaker?s incentives to mislead their audience, and (ii) the impact of speaker denials on audiences? moral and epistemic assessments of what has been said. We find that the extent to which speakers are judged responsible for the audience?s interpretations is modulated by their (the speakers?) incentives to mislead, but not by denials themselves. We also find that people are more willing than we expected to revise their interpretation of the speaker?s utterance when they learn that the ascribed meaning is false, regardless of whether the speaker is known to have had incentives to deceive their audience. In general, these findings are consistent with the idea that communicators are held responsible for the cognitive effects they trigger in their audience; rather than being responsible for, more narrowly, only the effects of what was ?literally? said. In light of our findings, we present a new, cognitive analysis of how audiences react to denials, drawing in particular on the Relevance Theory approach to communication. We distinguish in particular: (a) the spontaneous and intuitive re-interpretation of the original utterance in light of a denial; (b) the attribution of responsibility to the speaker for the cognitive effects of what is communicated; and (c) the reflective attribution of a particular intention to the speaker, which include argumentative considerations, higher-order deniability and reputational concerns. Existing experimental work, including our own, aims mostly at (a) and (b), and does not adequately control for (c). Deeper understanding of what can be credibly denied will be hindered unless and until this methodological problem is resolved.\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Expression unleashed: The evolutionary and cognitive foundations of human communication.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; and Scott-Phillips, T.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 46: 1-19. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Expression$ pdf\n \n \n \n $\"Expression$ video\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 17 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{heintz2023expression,\n\ttitle={Expression unleashed: The evolutionary and cognitive foundations of human communication},\n\tauthor={Heintz, Christophe and Scott-Phillips, Thom},\n\tjournal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},\n\tvolume={46},\n\tpages={1-19},\n\tyear={2023},\n\tpublisher={Cambridge University Press},\n\turl_pdf={https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/78C4D9A7771514275AF893D668B82EF2/S0140525X22000012a.pdf/expression-unleashed-the-evolutionary-and-cognitive-foundations-of-human-communication.pdf},\n\turl_video={https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pg7HRjjsAWk&t=132s},\n\tdoi={https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X22000012},\n\tkeywords={communication},\n\tabstract={ Human expression is open-ended, versatile, and diverse, ranging from ordinary language use to painting, from exaggerated displays of affection to micro-movements that aid coordination. Here we present and defend the claim that this expressive diversity is united by an interrelated suite of cognitive capacities, the evolved functions of which are the expression and recognition of informative intentions. We describe how evolutionary dynamics normally leash communi- cation to narrow domains of statistical mutual benefit, and how expression is unleashed in humans. The relevant cognitive capacities are cognitive adaptations to living in a partner choice social ecology; and they are, correspondingly, part of the ordinarily developing human cognitive phenotype, emerging early and reliably in ontogeny. In other words, we identify distinctive features of our species? social ecology to explain how and why humans, and only humans, evolved the cognitive capacities that, in turn, lead to massive diversity and open-endedness in means and modes of expression. Language use is but one of these modes of expression, albeit one of manifestly high importance. We make cross-species com- parisons, describe how the relevant cognitive capacities can evolve in a gradual manner, and survey how unleashed expression facilitates not only language use, but also novel behaviour in many other domains too, focusing on the examples of joint action, teaching, punishment, and art, all of which are ubiquitous in human societies but relatively rare in other species. Much of this diversity derives from graded aspects of human expression, which can be used to satisfy informative intentions in creative and new ways. We aim to help reorient cognitive pragmat- ics, as a phenomenon that is not a supplement to linguistic communication and on the periphery of language science, but rather the foundation of the many of the most distinctive features of human behaviour, society, and culture.}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Being ostensive (reply to commentaries on `Expression unleashed').\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; and Scott-Phillips, T.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 46: 45-53. 2023.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Being$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{heintz2022being,\n\ttitle={Being ostensive (reply to commentaries on `Expression unleashed')},\n\tauthor={Heintz, Christophe and Scott-Phillips, Thom},\n\tjournal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},\n\tvolume={46},\n\tpages={45-53},\n\tyear={2023},\n\tpublisher={Cambridge University Press},\n\turl_pdf={https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/78C4D9A7771514275AF893D668B82EF2/S0140525X22000012a.pdf/expression-unleashed-the-evolutionary-and-cognitive-foundations-of-human-communication.pdf},\n\tkeywords={communication},\n\tabstract={One of our main goals with ?Expression unleashed? was to highlight the distinctive, ostensive nature of human communication, and the many roles that ostension can play in human behavior and society. The commentaries we received forced us to be more precise about several aspects of this thesis. At the same time, no commentary chal- lenged the central idea that the manifest diversity of human expres- sion is underpinned by a common cognitive unity. Our reply is organized around six issues: (1) languages and their cultural evolu- tion; (2) the pervasiveness of expression in human behavior; (3) arti- ficial intelligence and ostensive communication; (4) communication in other animals; (5) the ecology and evolution of ostensive commu- nication; and (6) biolinguistics and pragmatics.}\n}\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n If you presume relevance, you don't need a bifocal lens.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Altinok, N.; Tatone, D.; Kiraly, I.; Heintz, C.; and Gergely, G.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45: e250. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"If$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{altinok2022if,\n\ttitle={If you presume relevance, you don't need a bifocal lens},\n\tauthor={Altinok, Nazli and Tatone, Denis and Kiraly, Ildiko and Heintz, Christophe and Gergely, Gyorgy},\n\tjournal={The Behavioral and Brain Sciences},\n\tvolume={45},\n\tpages={e250},\n\tyear={2022},\n\turl_pdf={https://psyarxiv.com/r7dp2/download},\n\tkeywords={communication},\n\tabstract={We argue for a relevance-guided learning mechanism to account for both innovative reproduction and faithful imitation by focusing on the role of communication in knowledge transmission. Unlike bifocal stance theory, this mechanism does not require a strict divide between instrumental and ritual-like actions, and the goals they respectively fulfill (material vs. social/ affiliative), to account for flexibility in action interpretation and reproduction.}\n}\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Institutions of epistemic vigilance: The case of the newspaper press.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Szegofi, A.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Social Epistemology, 36(5): 613-628. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Institutions$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{szegHofi2022institutions,\n\ttitle={Institutions of epistemic vigilance: The case of the newspaper press},\n\tauthor={Szegofi, Akos and Heintz, Christophe},\n\tjournal={Social Epistemology},\n\tvolume={36},\n\tnumber={5},\n\tpages={613-628},\n\tyear={2022},\n\tpublisher={Taylor \\& Francis},\n\tdoi={https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2109532},\n\turl_pdf={https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02691728.2022.2109532},\n\tkeywords={communication},\n\tabstract={Can people efficiently navigate the modern communication environment, and if yes, how? We hypothesize that in addition to psycholo- gical capacities of epistemic vigilance, which evaluate the epistemic value of communicated information, some social institutions have evolved for the same function. Certain newspapers for instance, implement processes, distributed among several experts and tools, whose function is to curate information. We analyze how information curation is done at the institutional level and what challenges it meets. We also investigate what factors favor the cultural evolution of institu- tions of epistemic vigilance: these include people's preference for accurate and reliable information and their ability to assess commu- nicated information in view of the source's epistemic authority; but also contingent historical factors that make it worth, or not, to contribute to the maintenance of institutions of epistemic vigilance. We conclude the paper by considering the challenges and vulnerabilities of these institutions in the Digital Age.}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Perceiving commitments: When we both know that you are counting on me.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bonalumi, F.; Michael, J.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Mind and Language, 37(4): 502-524. 2022.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Perceiving$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{bonalumi2022perceiving,\n\ttitle={Perceiving commitments: When we both know that you are counting on me},\n\tauthor={Bonalumi, Francesca and Michael, John and Heintz, Christophe},\n\tjournal={Mind and Language},\n\tvolume={37},\n\tnumber={4},\n\tpages={502-524},\n\tyear={2022},\n\tpublisher={Wiley Online Library},\n\tdoi={https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12333},\n\turl_pdf={https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/mila.12333?download=true},\n\tkeywords={social preferences, economic cognition},\n\tAbstract={Can commitments be generated without promises or gestures conventionally interpreted as such? We hypothesized that people believe that commitments are in place when one agent has led a recipient to rely on her to do something, even without a commissive speech act or any action conventionalized as such, and this is mutual knowledge. To probe this, we presented participants with online vignettes describing everyday situations in which a recipient's expectations were frustrated by one's behavior. Our results show that moral judgments differed significantly according to whether the recipient's reliance was mutually known, irrespective of whether this was verbally acknowledged.}\n}\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Commitment and communication: Are we committed to what we mean, or what we say?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Bonalumi, F.; Scott-Phillips, T.; Tacha, J.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Language and Cognition, 12(2): 360-384. 2020.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Commitment$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{bonalumi2020commitment,\n\ttitle={Commitment and communication: Are we committed to what we mean, or what we say?},\n\tauthor={Bonalumi, Francesca and Scott-Phillips, Thom and Tacha, Julius and Heintz, Christophe},\n\tjournal={Language and Cognition},\n\tvolume={12},\n\tnumber={2},\n\tpages={360-384},\n\tyear={2020},\n\tpublisher={Cambridge University Press},\n\tdoi={https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2020.2},\n\turl_pdf={https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/763D5D1BD8590F1CD56F62A562842D03/S1866980820000022a.pdf/commitment-and-communication-are-we-committed-to-what-we-mean-or-what-we-say.pdf},\n\tkeywords={communication},\n\tabstract={Are communicators perceived as committed to what they actually say (what is explicit), or to what they mean (including what is implicit)? Some research claims that explicit communication leads to a higher attribution of commitment and more accountability than implicit communication. Here we present theoretical arguments and experimental data to the con- trary. We present three studies exploring whether the saying/meaning distinction affects commitment attribution in promises, and, crucially, whether commitment attribution is further modulated by the degree to which the hearer will actually rely on the promise. Our results support the conclusion that people perceive communicators to be committed to `what is meant', and not simply to `what is said'. Our findings add to the experi- mental literature showing that the saying?meaning distinction is not as pivotal to social relations as often assumed, and that its role in commitment attribution might be overestimated. The attribution of commitment is strongly dependent on the (mutually known) relevance of `what is meant'.}\n}\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Gradualism in the evolution of ostensive communication.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; and Scott-Phillips, T.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference, pages 144-154, 2020. \n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Gradualism$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@inproceedings{heintz2020gradualism,\n\ttitle={Gradualism in the evolution of ostensive communication},\n\tauthor={Heintz, Christophe and Scott-Phillips, Thom},\n\tbooktitle={The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference},\n\tpages={144-154},\n\tyear={2020},\n\turl_pdf={https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_3190925/component/file_3260022/content#page=165},\n\tkeywords={communication},\n\tAbstract = {Most human communication is ostensive, and language use is the paradigmatic example. Here we offer a novel hypothesis about its gradual evolution in humans. We describe the graded distinctions between ostensive communication and other forms of intentional manipulation of mental states. On this basis, we show how ostensive communication could have evolved as a gradual empowerment of other social cognitive abilities to manipulate the mental states of others. We then describe the sort of social ecology in which ostensive communication is adaptive and evolutionarily stable. Specifically, we propose that cognitive processes specialised for ostensive communication will evolve only in a partner choice social ecology, where audience are able to withdraw their trust and select their informants with a high degree of possibility. We conclude with a novel suggestion about the nature of much non-human primate communication.}\n}\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Disentangling great apes' decoy-effect bias in a food choice task.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Sanchez-Amaro, A.; Altinok, N.; Heintz, C.; and Call, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Animal Behavior and Cognition, 6(3): 213-222. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Disentangling$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 7 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{sanchez2019disentangling,\n\ttitle={Disentangling great apes' decoy-effect bias in a food choice task},\n\tauthor={Sanchez-Amaro, Alejandro and Altinok, Nazli and Heintz, Christophe and Call, Josep},\n\tjournal={Animal Behavior and Cognition},\n\tyear={2019},\n\tvolume = {6},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages ={213-222},\n\tdoi ={https://doi.org/10.26451/abc.06.03.05.2019},\n\tAbstract = {The decoy effect is a violation of rationality that occurs when the relative preference between two target options changes with the addition of a third option, called the decoy, that is no better than the target options but worse than one of the options on one attribute. The presence of the decoy increases the chance that the option that dominates it on this attribute is chosen over the other target option. The current study tested decoy effects with great apes' food preferences. We presented apes with two target items, grape and banana, and a third item, the decoy, which was either a smaller grape or a smaller piece of banana. We found that apes' decisions were not influenced by the presence of a decoy. In general, apes did not increase their choices in favor of the target item that dominated the decoy. This would indicate that great apes are not vulnerable to the cognitive biases that cause decoy effects in humans, at least in cases where choice is between two different types of food. We discuss what can be concluded about the psychological causes of human irrational choices and their evolutionary origin.},\n\tkeywords={social preferences, economic cognition},\n\turl_pdf = {http://www.animalbehaviorandcognition.org/uploads/journals/24/AB_C_2019_Vol6(3)_S%C3%A1nchez-Amaro%20et%20al..pdf}\t\n}\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Methods for studying cultural attraction.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; Blancke, S.; and Scott-Phillips, T.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, 28(1): 18-20. 2019.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Methods$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 10 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{heintz2019methods,\n\ttitle={Methods for studying cultural attraction},\n\tauthor={Heintz, Christophe and Blancke, Stefaan and Scott-Phillips, Thom},\n\tjournal={Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews},\n\tvolume={28},\n\tnumber={1},\n\tpages={18-20},\n\tyear={2019},\n\tpublisher={Wiley Online Library},\n\tdoi = {10.1002/evan.21764},\n\tkeywords = {cultural evolution},\n\tAbstract = {Cultural attraction theory (CAT) describes a general evolutionary process, cultural attraction, by which the spread and stability of cultural items (beliefs, practices, artifacts, etc.) result not just from differential reproduction, but also from transformations that systematically favor the reconstruction of cultural items of specific types. In this way, CAT aims to provide a general framework for the study of cultural evolution. In a thoughtful critical analysis, Buskell questions the ability of CAT to provide methodological guidance for research in cultural evolution. Can CAT be used to develop the sort of mid-range theories and models that often drive empirical work? Here we argue that CAT can indeed be used in this way, and we outline the methodological practices that students of cultural attraction have used and are currently developing.},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/heintz-2019-methods.pdf}}\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Integration and the disunity of the social sciences.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; Charbonneau, M.; and Fogelman, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Nagatsu, M.; and Ruzzene, A., editor(s), Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Social Science: A Dialogue. Bloomsbury, 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Integration$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@incollection{Heintz2018integration,\n\tauthor = {Heintz, Christophe and Charbonneau, Mathieu and Fogelman, Jay},\n\ttitle = {Integration and the disunity of the social sciences},\n\tbooktitle = {Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Social Science: A Dialogue},\n\tEditor = {Nagatsu, Michiru and Ruzzene, Attilia},\n\tpublisher = {Bloomsbury},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tkeywords = {cultural evolution},\n\tAbstract = {We defend integrative pluralism: a view that recognises the utility of multiple approaches for understanding social phenomena, yet emphasizes the value of integrative research. Different fields of the social sciences rely on different methods and explanatory tools even when they study the very same phenomena. We illustrate this plurality of the social sciences with the studies of crowds. We show how three different takes on crowd phenomena (psychology, rational choice theory, and network theory) can complement one another. We conclude that social scientists are better described as researchers endowed with explanatory toolkits than specialists of some specific social domain. Social scientists' toolkits are adapted for identifying and specifying the role of specific causal factors among the multiple factors that produce social phenomena. These factors can be, in a non-exclusive way, economic incentives, psychological processes, the ecology or aspects of the social and cultural environment. The integrative research we advocate in this chapter are attempts to specify the role of such diverse causal factors.},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Heintz-Charbonneau-Fogelman-2018-integration.pdf}\n}\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Four misunderstandings about cultural attraction.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Scott-Phillips, T.; Blancke, S.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Evolutionary Anthropology, 27(4): 162–173. 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Four$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{ScottPhillips2017misunderstandings,\n\tauthor = {Scott-Phillips, Thom and Blancke, Stefaan and Heintz, Christophe},\n\ttitle = {Four misunderstandings about cultural attraction},\n\tjournal={Evolutionary Anthropology},\n\tvolume={27},\n\tnumber={4},\n\tpages={162--173},\n\tyear={2018},\n\tpublisher={Wiley Online Library},\n\tdoi = {10.1002/evan.21716},\n\turl_pdf = {https://thomscottphillips.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/scott-phillips-et-al-2018-four-misunderstandings-about-cat.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tkeywords={cultural evolution},\n\tabstract={Cultural attraction theory (CAT) is a research agenda the purpose of which is to develop causal explanations of cultural phenomena. CAT is also an evolutionary approach to culture, in the sense that it treats culture as a population of items of different types, with the frequency of tokens of those types changing over time. Now more than 20 years old, CAT has made many positive contributions, theoretical and empirical, to the naturalization of the social sciences. In consequence of this growing impact, CAT has, in recent years, been the subject of critical discussion. Here, we review and respond to these critiques. In so doing, we also provide a clear and concise introduction to CAT. We give clear characterizations of CAT's key theoretical notions, and we outline how these notions are derived from consideration of the natural character of cultural phenomena (Box 1). This naturalistic quality distinguishes CAT from other evolutionary approaches to culture.}\n}\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Cultural attraction theory.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Callan, H., editor(s), The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology. Wiley-Blackwell, 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Cultural$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 9 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@incollection{Heintz2017encyclopedia,\n\tauthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\ttitle = {Cultural attraction theory},\n\tEditor = {Callan, Hilary},\n\tdoi = {10.1002/9781118924396},\n\tbooktitle={The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Heintz2017-preprint-CulturalAttractionTheory.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tpublisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},\n\tkeywords = {cultural evolution},\n\tabstract={Cultural Attraction Theory (CAT), also referred to as cultural epidemiology, is an evolutionary theory of culture. It provides conceptual tools and a theoretical framework for explaining why and how ideas, practices, artifacts and other cultural items spread and persist in a community and its habitat. It states that cultural phenomena result from psychological or ecological factors of attraction.}\n}\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Updating evolutionary epistemology.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Soetaert, R.; Blancke, S.; and Rutten, K., editor(s), Perspectives on Science and Culture. Purdue University Press, 2018.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Updating$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 8 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@incollection{heintz2018updating,\n\ttitle={Updating evolutionary epistemology},\n\tauthor={Heintz, Christophe},\n\tAbstract={\n\tChristophe Heintz argues that evolutionary epistemology is a theoretical framework for the study of science as a historical and cultural phenomenon. As spelled out by Campbell in the 70's, evolutionary epistemology has an ambitious goal: it aims at understanding the complex relations between biological evolution, especially biological evolution of human cognition, and the cultural evolution of scientific knowledge. It eventually aims at forming an integrated causal theory of the evolution of science, starting with the evolution of human cognition. In this chapter, the author considers Campbell's project and specify why it is still today a worthwhile project for explaining the evolution of science as a specific case of cultural evolution. But he also criticizes Campbell's evolutionary epistemology for assuming that blind variation and selective retention is the process through which science evolves. This assumption, the author argues, is at odd with much of what we know about scientific cognition and the history of science. He advocates: (1) dropping the methodological constraint of looking for processes of blind variation and selective retention at the expense of other constructive processes and mechanisms of knowledge production, but (2) retaining the integrative point of evolutionary epistemology, which implies taking seriously the results of evolutionary psychology and (3) retaining the populational framework for explaining the history of science, which means questioning why some scientific beliefs and practices eventually spread and stabilize in a scientific community. We end up with an updated research programme for evolutionary epistemology, which faces new challenges.},\n\tbooktitle={Perspectives on Science and Culture},\n\tEditor = {Soetaert, Ronald and Blancke, Stefaan and Rutten, Kris},\n\tyear={2018},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Heintz-2018-UpdatingEvolutionaryEpistemology.pdf},\n\tpublisher={Purdue University Press},\n\tkeywords={scientific cognition, cultural evolution}\n}\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The epidemiology of a mathematical representation: the `infinitesimal' at the end of the 17th century in France.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n 2017.\n Working paper.\n\n\n\n
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@unpublished{Heintz2017infinitesimals,\n\tauthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\ttitle = {The epidemiology of a mathematical representation: the `infinitesimal' at the end of the 17th century in France},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/EpidemioInfinite130821.pdf},\n\tyear = {2017},\n\tkeywords={scientific cognition, cultural evolution},\n\tnote = {Working paper.}\n}\n\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The Co-evolution of Honesty and Strategic Vigilance.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; Karabegovic, M.; and Molnar, A.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Frontiers in Psychology, 7: 1503. 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"The$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{heintz2016co-evolution,\n\tAbstract = {We hypothesize that when honesty is not motivated by selfish goals, it reveals social preferences that have evolved for convincing strategically vigilant partners that one is a person worth cooperating with. In particular, we explain how the patterns of dishonest behavior observed in recent experiments can be motivated by preferences for social and self-esteem. These preferences have evolved because they are adaptive in an environment where it is advantageous to be selected as a partner by others and where these others are strategically vigilant: they efficiently evaluate the expected benefit of cooperating with specific partners and attend to their intentions. We specify the adaptive value of strategic vigilance and preferences for social and self esteem. We argue that evolved preferences for social and self-esteem are satisfied by applying mechanisms of strategic vigilance to one's own behavior. We further argue that such cognitive processes obviate the need for the evolution of preferences for fairness and social norm compliance.},\n\tauthor = {Heintz, Christophe and Karabegovic, Mia and Molnar, Andras},\n\tdoi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01503},\n\tissn = {1664-1078},\n\tjournal = {Frontiers in Psychology},\n\tpages = {1503},\n\ttitle = {{The Co-evolution of Honesty and Strategic Vigilance}},\n\turl_pdf = {https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01503/pdf},\n\tvolume = {7},\n\tyear = {2016},\n\tkeywords={social preferences, economic cognition}\n}\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Beliefs about people's prosociality: Eliciting predictions in dictator games.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Molnar, A.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Department of Economics - CEU working papers series, (2016-1). 2016.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Molnar2016beliefs,\n\ttitle={Beliefs about people's prosociality: Eliciting predictions in dictator games},\n\tauthor={Molnar, A. and Heintz, C.},\n\tjournal={Department of Economics - CEU working papers series},\n\tyear={2016},\n\tAbstract={\n\tOne of the most pervasive economic decisions that people have to take is whether to enter an economic interaction. A rational decision process takes into account the probability that the partner will act in a favorable way, making the interaction or the cooperative activity beneficial. Do people actually decide upon such predictions? If yes,are these predictions accurate? We describe a novel experimental method for eliciting participants' implicit beliefs about their partners' prosociality: In a modified dictator game, receivers are offered to forgo what the dictator shall transfer and take a sure amount instead. We then infer receivers' subjective probabilities that the dictator makes a prosocial decision. Our results show that people do form prior beliefs about others' actions based on others' incentives, and that they decide whether to enter an interaction based on these beliefs. People know that others have prosocial as well as selfish preferences, yet the prior beliefs about others' prosocial choices is biased: First, participants underestimate others' prosociality. Second, their predictions about others' choice correlate with their own choice, reflecting a consensus effect. We also find a systematic difference between implicit and explicit predictions of others' choices: Implicit beliefs reflect more trust towards others than explicit statements.},\n\turl_pdf = {http://www.personal.ceu.hu/staff/repec/pdf/2016_1.pdf},\n\tnumber={2016-1},\n\tkeywords={social preferences, economic cognition}\n}\n\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Facing expectations: Those that we prefer to fulfill and those that we disregard.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; Celse, J.; Giardini, F.; and Max, S.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Judgment and Decision Making, 10(5): 442-455. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Facing$ html\n \n \n \n $\"Facing$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{heintz2015facing,\n\ttitle={Facing expectations: Those that we prefer to fulfill and those that we disregard},\n\tauthor={Heintz, C. and Celse, J. and Giardini, F. and Max, S.},\n\tjournal={Judgment and Decision Making},\n\tvolume={10},\n\tnumber={5},\n\tpages={442-455},\n\tyear={2015},\n\tAbstract={\n\tWe argue that people choosing prosocial distribution of goods (e.g., in dictator games) make this choice because they do not want to disappoint their partner rather than because of a direct preference for the chosen prosocial distribution. The chosen distribution is a means to fulfil one's partner's expectations. We review the economic experiments that corroborate this hypothesis and the experiments that deny that beliefs about others' expectations motivate prosocial choice. We then formulate hypotheses about what types of expectation motivate someone to do what is expected: these are justifiable hopeful expectations that are clearly about his own choices. We experimentally investigate how people modulate their prosociality when they face low or unreasonably high expectations. In a version of a dictator game, we provide dictators with the opportunity to modulate their transfer as a function of their partner's expectations. We observe that a significant portion of the population is willing to fulfil their partner's expectation provided that this expectation expresses a reasonable hope. We conclude that people are averse to disappointing and we discuss what models of social preferences can account for the role of expectations in determining prosocial choice, with a special attention to models of guilt aversion and social esteem. },\n\turl_html = {http://journal.sjdm.org/15/15204/jdm15204.html},\n\turl_pdf = {http://journal.sjdm.org/15/15204/jdm15204.pdf},\n\tkeywords={social preferences, economic cognition}\n}\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Experts and laymen grossly underestimate the benefits of argumentation for reasoning.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mercier, H.; Trouche, E.; Yama, H.; Heintz, C.; and Girotto, V.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Thinking & Reasoning, 21(3): 341-355. 2015.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Experts$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 4 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{mercier2015experts,\n\ttitle={Experts and laymen grossly underestimate the benefits of argumentation for reasoning},\n\tauthor={Mercier, Hugo and Trouche, Emmanuel and Yama, Hiroshi and Heintz, Christophe and Girotto, Vittorio},\n\tAbstract={ \n\tMany fields of study have shown that group discussion generally improves reasoning performance for a wide range of tasks. This article shows that most of the population, including specialists, does not expect group discussion to be as beneficial as it is. Six studies asked participants to solve a standard reasoning problem�the Wason selection task�and to estimate the performance of individuals working alone and in groups. We tested samples of U.S., Indian, and Japanese participants, European managers, and psychologists of reasoning. Every sample underestimated the improvement yielded by group discussion. They did so even after they had been explained the correct answer, or after they had had to solve the problem in groups. These mistaken intuitions could prevent individuals from making the best of institutions that rely on group discussion, from collaborative learning and work teams to deliberative assemblies.},\n\tdoi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2014.981582},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Mercier-2015-Experts.pdf},\n\tjournal={Thinking \\& Reasoning},\n\tvolume={21},\n\tnumber={3},\n\tpages={341-355},\n\tyear={2015},\n\tpublisher={Routledge},\n\tkeywords={economic cognition, communication}\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Scientists' argumentative reasoning.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mercier, H.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Topoi, 33(2): 513-524. 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Scientists'$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{mercier2014scientists,\n\ttitle={ Scientists' argumentative reasoning},\n\tauthor={Mercier, Hugo and Heintz, Christophe},\n\tAbstract = {Reasoning, defined as the production and evaluation of reasons, is a central process in science. The dominant view of reasoning, both in the psychology of reasoning and in the psychology of science, is of a mechanism with an asocial function: bettering the beliefs of the lone reasoner. Many observations, however, are difficult to reconcile with this view of reasoning; in particular, reasoning systematically searches for reasons that support the reasoner's initial beliefs, and it only evaluates these reasons cursorily. By contrast, reasoners are well able to evaluate others' reasons: accepting strong arguments and rejecting weak ones. The argumentative theory of reasoning accounts for these traits of reasoning by postulating that the evolved function of reasoning is to argue: to find arguments to convince others and to change one's mind when confronted with good arguments. Scientific reasoning, however, is often described as being at odds with such an argumentative  mechanisms: scientists are supposed to reason objectively on their own, and to be pigheaded when their theories are challenged, even by good arguments. In this article, we review evidence showing that scientists, when reasoning, are subject to the same biases as are lay people while being able to change their mind when confronted with good arguments. We conclude that the argumentative theory of reasoning explains well key features of scientists' reasoning and that differences in the way scientists and laypeople reason result from the institutional framework of science.},\n\tjournal={Topoi},\n\tvolume={33},\n\tnumber={2},\n\tpages={513-524},\n\tyear={2014},\n\tDoi = {10.1007/s11245-013-9217-4},\n\tKeywords = {scientific cognition, communication},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Mercier-Heintz-2014-Scientists.pdf},\n\tpublisher={Springer Netherlands}\n}\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Current Darwinism in Social Science.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; and Claidiere, N.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Handbook of Evolutionary Thinking in the Sciences, pages 781-807. Springer Netherlands, 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Current$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@incollection{heintz2014current,\n\ttitle={Current Darwinism in Social Science},\n\tauthor={Heintz, Christophe and Claidiere, Nicolas},\n\tAbstract={\n\tDarwinian theories concerned with human behaviour come in many\n\tforms. They can describe both the biological evolution of human cognition and the\n\tevolution of cultural traits in human communities. We briefly review these two\n\ttypes of Darwinian theories, including socio-biology, evolutionary psychology,\n\tmemetics and dual inheritance theory, and show how insights from both types can\n\tbe combined in a single framework: cultural epidemiology. We argue, however, that\n\tthis is profitable only if selectionists models of cultural evolution are replaced by an\n\tattractor model. },\n\tbooktitle={Handbook of Evolutionary Thinking in the Sciences},\n\tpages={781-807},\n\tyear={2014},\n\tdoi={10.1007/978-94-017-9014-7_37},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Heintz-Claidire-2014-Darwinism.pdf},\n\tpublisher={Springer Netherlands},\n\tkeywords={cultural evolution}\n}\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Scaffolding on Core Cognition.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Caporael, L.; Wimsatt, W. C.; and Griesemer, J., editor(s), Developing Scaffolds in Evolution, Culture, and Cognition, pages 209-228. MIT Press, 2014.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Scaffolding$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 2 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@incollection{heintz2014scaffolding,\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tAbstract={Cognitive flexibility can be achieved via a scaffolding process that harness the inferential power of core cognitive abilities.},\n\tBooktitle = {Developing Scaffolds in Evolution, Culture, and Cognition},\n\tEditor = {Caporael, Linnda and Wimsatt, William C. and Griesemer, James},\n\tKeywords = {cultural evolution, scientific cognition},\n\tPages = {209-228},\n\tPublisher = {MIT Press},\n\tTitle = {{Scaffolding on Core Cognition}},\n\tdoi = {https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262019552.003.0010},\n\tUrl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Heintz-2013-Scaffolding.pdf},\n\tYear = {2014}}\n\n\n

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\n \n 2013\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Essay review: Chrisomalis, S. 2010. Numerical notation.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 19(3): 664-666. September 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{Heintz2013i,\n\tauthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tdoi = {10.1111/1467-9655.12058_8},\n\tissn = {13590987},\n\tjournal = {Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute},\n\tmonth = sep,\n\tnumber = {3},\n\tpages = {664-666},\n\ttitle = {{Essay review: Chrisomalis, S. 2010. Numerical notation}},\n\tkeywords={cultural evolution, scientific cognition},\n\tvolume = {19},\n\tyear = {2013}}\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What can't be inferred from cross-cultural experimental games.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Current Anthropology, 54(2): 165-166. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"What$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 6 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{Heintz2013c,\n\tAbstract = {People from different cultures will interpret the experimental game they play differently; they will form different beliefs about what their partners will play and expect. I argue that the variations observed in experimental games ran across cultures might very much result from framing effects---cultural framing effects---rather than variations in pro-social preferences.},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Heintz-2017-cross-cultural experimental games.pdf},\n\tJournal = {Current Anthropology},\n\tKeywords = {cultural evolution, social preferences, economic cognition},\n\tNumber = {2},\n\tPages = {165-166},\n\tTitle = {{What can't be inferred from cross-cultural experimental games}},\n\tVolume = {54},\n\tYear = {2013}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n The place of evolved cognition in scientific thinking.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Mercier, H.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Religion, Brain and Behavior,10-16. 2013.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{Mercier2013,\n\tAbstract = {There are three ways in which scientific cognition can me more ``natural" than McCauley suggests, in his book `Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not': (1) reasoning, which is at the heart of scientific cognition, is a very `natural' activity when it is conducted in a dialogic context; (2) even when reasoning is used in a slower, more effortful manner, it can be recruited in a ``natural" ways; (3) unintuitive scientific beliefs are built on a scaffold of more intuitive beliefs and core knowledge.},\n\tAuthor = {Mercier, Hugo and Heintz, Christophe},\n\tJournal = {Religion, Brain and Behavior},\n\tKeywords = {scientific cognition},\n\tPages = {10-16},\n\tTitle = {{The place of evolved cognition in scientific thinking}},\n\tYear = {2013},\n\tdoi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2013.767036}}\n\n\n\n

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\n \n 2012\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Essay review: Carey, S. 2009. The Origin of Concepts.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Metascience, 21(2): 439-444. November 2012.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{Heintz2012,\n\tauthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tdoi = {10.1007/s11016-011-9605-6},\n\tissn = {0815-0796},\n\tjournal = {Metascience},\n\tmonth = nov,\n\tnumber = {2},\n\tpages = {439-444},\n\ttitle = {{Essay review: Carey, S. 2009. The Origin of Concepts}},\n\tkeywords = {scientific cognition},\n\tvolume = {21},\n\tyear = {2012}\n}\n\n\n

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\n \n 2011\n \n \n (5)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Les fondements psychiques et sociaux de la cognition distribu�e.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Clement, F.; and Kaufmann, L., editor(s), La sociologie cognitive. Paris: Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Les$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@incollection{Heintz2011a,\n\tAbstract = {{Apgrave;s avoir pr&eacute;sent&eacute; et expliqu&eacute; la notion de cognition distribu&eacute;e, je situerai l'analyse qu'elle permet au sein des sciences cognitives et de la sociologie. Mes buts sont de montrer en quoi la th&eacute;orie de la cognition distribu&eacute;e contribue aux th&eacute;ories de la psychologie et de la sociologie, et r&eacute;ciproquement comment les th&eacute;ories de la sociologie et de la psychologie peuvent &ecirc;tre recrut&eacute;es pour expliquer l'existence de syst&egrave;mes de cognition distribu&eacute;e. La troisi&egrave;me section de ce chapitre est centr&eacute;e sur les relations entre psychologie et th&eacute;orie de la cognition distribu&eacute;e. Elle montre que la sociologie de la cognition distribu&eacute;e b&eacute;n&eacute; &agrave; &ecirc;tre une sociologie cognitive de la cognition distribu&eacute;e. La quatri&egrave;me partie continue cet argument, mais en soulignant les ph&eacute;nom&egrave;nes typiquement sociologique qui interviennent dans la constitution et l'&eacute;volution des syst&egrave;mes de cognition distribu&egrave;e"}},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tBooktitle = {La sociologie cognitive},\n\tEditor = {Clement, Fabrice and Kaufmann, Laurence},\n\tKeywords = {cultural evolution, trust},\n\tPublisher = {Paris: Maison des sciences de l'homme},\n\turl_pdf={https://philpapers.org/archive/HEILFP.pdf},\n\tTitle = {{Les fondements psychiques et sociaux de la cognition distribu�e}},\n\tYear = {2011}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n The Specificity of Human Communication Eludes Semiotic Theories.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Morin, O.; and Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Current Anthropology, 52(5): 732-733. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{Morin2011,\n\tAbstract = {Naturalistic accounts of culture, based on evolutionary psychology and theories of cultural evolution, can deal with the meaning of public symbols. There have been, indeed, several interesting proposals to naturalize the study of signs and their meaning. Kockelman' paper---Biosemiosis, technocognition and sociogenesis---provides such a proposal. It draws on two theoretical traditions: the semiotic study of natural signs (Peirce 1868) and the selectionist account of signals proposed by Ruth Millikan (1984). We feel the pull of both approaches, but we fundamentally disagree with the way they account for human communication. We argue that Gricean theories of communication provide a better account of interpretation and communication.},\n\tAuthor = {Morin, Olivier and Heintz, Christophe},\n\tJournal = {Current Anthropology},\n\tKeywords = {cultural evolution, communication},\n\tNumber = {5},\n\tPages = {732-733},\n\tTitle = {{The Specificity of Human Communication Eludes Semiotic Theories}},\n\tVolume = {52},\n\tYear = {2011}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Presuming placeholders are relevant enables conceptual change.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(03): 131-132. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{Heintz2011,\n\tAbstract = {Placeholders enable conceptual change only if presumed to be relevant (e.g., lead to the formation of true beliefs) even though their meaning is not yet fully understood and their cognitive function not yet specified. Humans are predisposed to make such presumptions in a communicative context. Specifying the role of the presumption of relevance in conceptual change would provide a more comprehensive account of Quinian bootstrapping.},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tIssn = {1469-1825},\n\tJournal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},\n\tKeywords = {scientific cognition},\n\tLanguage = {English},\n\tMendeley-Tags = {scientific_cognition},\n\tNumber = {03},\n\tPages = {131-132},\n\tTitle = {{Presuming placeholders are relevant enables conceptual change}},\n\tdoi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X10002347},\n\tVolume = {34},\n\tYear = {2011},\n}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n How Evolutionary is Evolutionary Economics?.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; Callebaut, W.; and Marengo, L.,\n editors.\n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n Biological Theory, Volume 6, Issue 4, 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@book{Heintz2011b,\n\tEditor = {Heintz, Christophe and Callebaut, Werner and Marengo, Luigi},\n\tKeywords = {cultural evolution},\n\tPages = {291-423},\n\tPublisher = {Biological Theory, Volume 6, Issue 4},\n\tTitle = {{How Evolutionary is Evolutionary Economics?}},\n\tYear = {2011}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Editorial: How Evolutionary is Evolutionary Economics?.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; Callebaut, W.; and Marengo, L.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Biological Theory, 6(4): 291-292. 2011.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Heintz2011c,\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe and Callebaut, Werner and Marengo, Luigi},\n\tDoi = {10.1007/s13752-013-0088-0},\n\tJournal = {Biological Theory},\n\tKeywords = {cultural evolution},\n\tNumber = {4},\n\tPages = {291-292},\n\tTitle = {{Editorial: How Evolutionary is Evolutionary Economics?}},\n\tVolume = {6},\n\tYear = {2011}}\n\n

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\n \n 2010\n \n \n (6)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Ethnographic cognition and Writing Culture.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Kumoll, K.; and Zenker, O., editor(s), Beyond Writing Culture. Oxford, UK: Berghahn, 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Ethnographic$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@incollection{Heintz2010g,\n\tAbstract = {I suggest that one of the best ways to pursue and go beyond the programme of Writing Culture is to do cognitive anthropology of anthropology. I will situate Writing Culture with regard to this field of research and I will argue that Writing Culture can contribute to the development of the cognitive anthropology of anthropology. This is because it is sensible to start the anthropological study of anthropology with an analysis of the cultural product -- in our case, the ethnographic texts. The analyst can then pick up relevant properties of the cultural product and track down what caused them. Among these causes stand the cognitive processes of actual practitioners, namely working ethnographers. Thus, starting with textual analysis, I argue that some rhetoric conventions analysed in Writing Cultures are informing the reader about the cognitive genesis of the ethnography. These conventions, far from being misleading, are in fact relevant to the reader: in particular information about the cognitive genesis of an ethnographic text enables the reader to evaluate its ethnographic account. This gives me the occasion to briefly specify some cognitive processes at work in the production of ethnographies. These include, I argue, a reflexive and critical cognition that is distributed among the community of anthropologists, and ``mind-reading'' --- a cognitive process much studied by cognitive psychologists that enables ethnographers to make sense of the behaviour of indigenous people by attributing mental states to them (beliefs, intentions, desires, feelings).},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\turl_pdf = {ftp://christophe.heintz@ftpperso.free.fr/papers/Heintz08ethnographic.pdf},\n\tBooktitle = {Beyond Writing Culture},\n\tEditor = {Kumoll, Karsten and Zenker, Olaf},\n\tKeywords = {scientific cognition},\n\tPublisher = {Oxford, UK: Berghahn},\n\tTitle = {{Ethnographic cognition and Writing Culture}},\n\tYear = {2010}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Experimental economics and the social embedding of economic behavior and cognition.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; and Bardsley, N.,\n editors.\n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n Mind and Society 9 (2): Thematic issue, 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@book{Heintz2010f,\n\tEditor = {Heintz, Christophe and Bardsley, Nicholas},\n\tKeywords = {cultural evolution, economic cognition},\n\tPublisher = {Mind and Society 9 (2): Thematic issue},\n\tTitle = {{Experimental economics and the social embedding of economic behavior and cognition}},\n\tYear = {2010}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Folk Epistemology.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; Taraborelli, D.; and Pouscoulous, N.,\n editors.\n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1(4): Thematic issue, 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Folk$ Paper\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@book{Heintz2010e,\n\tEditor = {Heintz, Christophe and Taraborelli, Dario and Pouscoulous, Nausicaa},\n\tKeywords = {trust},\n\tPublisher = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1(4): Thematic issue},\n\turl = {http://link.springer.com/journal/13164/1/4/page/1},\n\tTitle = {{Folk Epistemology}},\n\tYear = {2010}}\n\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n The implication of social cognition for experimental economics.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; and Bardsley, N.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Mind and Society, 9(2): 113-118. November 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{Heintz2010d,\n\tAbstract = {Can human social cognitive processes and social motives be grasped by the methods of experimental economics? Experimental studies of strategic cognition and social preferences contribute to our understanding of the social aspects of economic decisions making. Yet, papers in this issue argue that the social aspects of decision-making introduce several difficulties for interpreting the results of economic experiments. In particular, the laboratory is itself a social context, and in many respects a rather distinctive one, which raises questions of external validity.},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe and Bardsley, Nicholas},\n\tDoi = {10.1007/s11299-010-0082-1},\n\tIssn = {1593-7879},\n\tJournal = {Mind and Society},\n\tKeywords = {cultural evolution, economic cognition},\n\tMonth = nov,\n\tNumber = {2},\n\tPages = {113-118},\n\tPublisher = {Springer Berlin / Heidelberg},\n\tTitle = {{The implication of social cognition for experimental economics}},\n\tVolume = {9},\n\tYear = {2010}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Epistemic Vigilance.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Sperber, D.; Clément, F.; Heintz, C.; Mascaro, O.; Mercier, H.; Origgi, G.; and Wilson, D.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Mind and Language, 25(4): 359-393. August 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Epistemic$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{Dan2010,\n\tAbstract = {Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology and the social sciences.},\n\tAuthor = {Sperber, Dan and Cl&eacute;ment, Fabrice and Heintz, Christophe and Mascaro, Olivier and Mercier, Hugo and Origgi, Gloria and Wilson, Deirde},\n\tDoi = {10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01394.x},\n\tIssn = {02681064},\n\tJournal = {Mind and Language},\n\tKeywords = {communication, trust},\n\tMonth = aug,\n\tNumber = {4},\n\tPages = {359-393},\n\tPublisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC},\n\tTitle = {{Epistemic Vigilance}},\n\tUrl_pdf = {http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/Epistemic-Vigilance-published.pdf},\n\tVolume = {25},\n\tYear = {2010}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Folk Epistemology. The Cognitive Bases of Epistemic Evaluation.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; and Taraborelli, D.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(4): 477-482. December 2010.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Heintz2010,\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe and Taraborelli, Dario},\n\tDoi = {10.1007/s13164-010-0046-8},\n\tIssn = {18785158},\n\tJournal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},\n\tKeywords = {trust},\n\tMonth = dec,\n\tNumber = {4},\n\tPages = {477-482},\n\tPublisher = {Springer Netherlands},\n\tTitle = {{Folk Epistemology. The Cognitive Bases of Epistemic Evaluation}},\n\tkeywords={trust, communication},\n\tVolume = {1},\n\tYear = {2010}}\n\n

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\n \n 2009\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Cognitive history and cultural epidemiology.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Martin, L. H.; and Sorensen, J., editor(s), Past Minds: Studies in Cognitive Historiography, 2. Equinox Press, London, 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Cognitive$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 3 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@incollection{Heintz2009,\n\tAbstract = {Cultural epidemiology is a theoretical framework that enables historical studies to be informed by cognitive science. It incorporates insights from evolutionary psychology (viz. cultural evolution is constrained by universal properties of the human cognitive apparatus that result from biological evolution) and from Darwinian models of cultural evolution (viz. population thinking: cultural phenomena are distributions of resembling items among a community and its habitat). Its research program includes the study of the multiple cognitive mechanisms that cause the distribution, on a cultural scale, of representations and material cultural items. By a detailed analysis of the social cognitive causal chain that occurred in the past, one can find out and specify which are the factors of attraction that account for cultural stability as well as historical cultural change. After reviewing recent research and developments in cognitive history, I present the concept of cultural attractor and explain why cultural attractors are historically variable. In doing so, I emphasize the role of historically constituted cognitive mechanisms, which account for much of historical cultural developments. I argue that the framework of cultural epidemiology can better account for these important historical phenomena than either evolutionary psychology accounts of culture or dual inheritance theory. I conclude that describing and explaining the history of cultural attractors is a good research goal for historians.},\n\tAddress = {London},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tBooktitle = {Past Minds: Studies in Cognitive Historiography},\n\tChapter = {2},\n\tEditor = {Martin, Luther H. and Sorensen, Jesper},\n\tKeywords = {cultural evolution},\n\tPublisher = {Equinox Press},\n\tTitle = {{Cognitive history and cultural epidemiology}},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Heintz - 2009 - Cognitive history and cultural epidemiology.pdf},\n\tYear = {2009}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Darwinismes contemporains en sciences humaines.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; and Claidiere, N.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Lecointre, G.; Huneman, P.; Machery, E.; Silberstein, M.; and Athane, F., editor(s), Les mondes darwiniens. Editions Syllepse, 2009.\n \n\n\n\n
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@incollection{Heintz2009a,\n\tAbstract = {Nous pr&eacute;sentons les travaux en sciences sociales des derni&eacute;res cinquante ann&eacute;es qui se sont inspir&eacute;s des &eacute;tudes Darwiniennes sur l'&eacute;volution. Nous distinguons diff&eacute;rents types de Darwinisme en sciences sociales selon l'utilisation des notions Darwiniennes : le Darwinisme biologique est utilis&eacute; pour rendre compte des comportements humains et le Darwinisme universel est utilis\\'e pour rendre compte de l'&eacute;volution culturel le. Nous concluons sur une description de ce qui nous semble la meilleure exploitation du Darwinisme en sciences sociales, l'&eacute;pid&eacute;miologie culturelle.},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe and Claidiere, Nicolas},\n\tBooktitle = {Les mondes darwiniens},\n\tEditor = {Lecointre, G. and Huneman, P. and Machery, E. and Silberstein, M. and Athane, F.},\n\tKeywords = {cultural evolution},\n\tPublisher = {Editions Syllepse},\n\tTitle = {{Darwinismes contemporains en sciences humaines}},\n\tYear = {2009}}\n\n

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\n \n 2007\n \n \n (2)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Institutions as Mechanisms of Cultural Evolution: Prospects of the Epidemiological Approach.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Biological Theory, 2(3): 244-249. August 2007.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Heintz2007,\n\tAbstract = {Studying institutions as part of the research on cultural evolution prompts us to analyze one very important mechanism of cultural evolution: institutions do distribute cultural variants in the population. Also, it enables relating current research on cultural evolution to somemore traditional social sciences: institutions, often seen as macro-social entities, are analyzed in terms of their constitutive micro-phenomena. This article presents Sperber's characterization of institutions, and then gives some hints about the set of phenomena to which it applies. Culture evolves through the advent of cognitive causal chains, which span across individuals and their environment, and which distribute mental representations and public production in the population and its habitat. Institutions are characterized by the specific causal chains that distribute representations. These chains include representations that cause the recurrence of a series of events and thus regulate the distribution of a set of representations to which they themselves belong. Saying that some cultural phenomenon is an institution is, in this theoretical framework, explaining that some representations that are part of the cultural phenomenon cause it to endure. This technical characterization applies to what is usually understood as institutions, from marriage to money. It also opens the way for the analysis of complex phenomena in cultural evolution, such as themaintenance of cultural niches and the distribution of labor.},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tDoi = {10.1162/biot.2007.2.3.244},\n\tJournal = {Biological Theory},\n\tKeywords = {cultural evolution},\n\tLanguage = {en},\n\tMonth = aug,\n\tNumber = {3},\n\tPages = {244-249},\n\tPublisher = {MIT Press},\n\tTitle = {{Institutions as Mechanisms of Cultural Evolution: Prospects of the Epidemiological Approach}},\n\tpdf={https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1162/biot.2007.2.3.244.pdf},\n\tVolume = {2},\n\tYear = {2007}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Scientific cognition and cultural evolution: theoretical tools for integrating cognitive and social studies of science.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Ph.D. Thesis, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, June 2007.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Scientific$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 5 downloads\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@phdthesis{Heintz2007a,\n\tAbstract = {The present work is a study in the historiography of science. Its goal is to provide some theoretical tools for studying the evolution of science as a social and cognitive phenomenon. It aims at showing that some concepts and frames of analysis drawn from cognitive anthropology are fruitful tools for the scientific study of science. The theories that I advocate using are the epidemiology of representation and the theory of distributed cognition. The added value of these theories stems in great part from their enabling to integrate results from cognitive and social studies of science.},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tKeywords = {scientific cognition, cultural evolution},\n\tMonth = jun,\n\tSchool = {Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales},\n\tTitle = {Scientific cognition and cultural evolution: theoretical tools for integrating cognitive and social studies of science},\n\tUrl_pdf = {https://theses.hal.science/tel-00145899v1/file/Heintz-thesis.pdf},\n\tYear = {2007}}\n\n

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\n \n 2006\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Web search engines and distributed assessment systems.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Pragmatics and Cognition, 14(2): 387-409. 2006.\n \n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n \n \n $\"Web$ pdf\n \n \n\n \n \n doi\n \n \n\n \n link\n \n \n\n bibtex\n \n\n \n \n \n abstract \n \n\n \n \n \n 1 download\n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\n\n\n

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@article{Heintz2006,\n\tAbstract = {I analyse the impact of search engines on our cognitive and epistemic practices. For that purpose, I describe the processes of assessment of documents on the Web as relying on distributed cognition. Search engines together with Web users, are distributed assessment systems whose task is to enable efficient allocation of cognitive resources of those who use search engines. Specifying the cognitive function of search engines within these distributed assessment systems allows interpreting anew the changes that have been caused by search engine technologies. I describe search engines as implementing reputation systems and point out the similarities with other reputation systems. I thus call attention to the continuity in the distributed cognitive processes that determine the allocation of cognitive resources for information gathering from others.},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tDoi = {10.1075/pc.14.2.15hei},\n\tJournal = {Pragmatics and Cognition},\n\tKeywords = {communication, trust},\n\tNumber = {2},\n\tPages = {387-409},\n\tPublisher = {John Benjamins Publishing Company},\n\tTitle = {Web search engines and distributed assessment systems},\n\turl_pdf={https://philpapers.org/archive/HEIWSE-2.pdf},\n\tVolume = {14},\n\tYear = {2006}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n The ecological rationality of strategic cognition.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(06): 825-826. December 2005.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Heintz2005,\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tDate-Modified = {2013-12-12 18:24:30 +0100},\n\tIssn = {1469-1825},\n\tJournal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},\n\tKeywords = {social preferences, economic cognition},\n\tLanguage = {English},\n\tMonth = dec,\n\tNumber = {06},\n\tPages = {825-826},\n\tTitle = {{The ecological rationality of strategic cognition}},\n\turl_pdf = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/F21DB6702582F1E8B281B755FFE954A1/S0140525X05320140a.pdf/the-ecological-rationality-of-strategic-cognition.pdf},\n\tVolume = {28},\n\tYear = {2005}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n What do we get when dipping a brain into science?.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Bara, B. G; Barsalou, L; and Bucciarelli, M, editor(s), Proceedings of the XXVII Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, pages 917-922, Mahwah, 2005. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates\n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{Heintz2005a,\n\tAbstract = {I argue that scientific cognition can be accounted for in a massive modularity theoretical framework. Scientific cognition is then described as a culturally informed reflection, allowed by meta-representational abilities, upon the mandatory output of preliminary modules.},\n\tAddress = {Mahwah},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tBooktitle = {Proceedings of the XXVII Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society},\n\tEditor = {Bara, B. G and Barsalou, L and Bucciarelli, M},\n\tKeywords = {scientific cognition},\n\tPages = {917-922},\n\tPublisher = {Lawrence Erlbaum Associates},\n\tTitle = {{What do we get when dipping a brain into science?}},\n\tUrl_pdf = {http://www.psych.unito.it/csc/cogsci05/frame/talk/f279-heintz.pdf},\n\tYear = {2005}}\n\n

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\n \n 2004\n \n \n (3)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Studies in Cognitive Anthropology of Science.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.,\n editor.\n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Cognition and Culture 4 (3-4): Thematic issues, 2004.\n \n\n\n\n
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@book{Heintz2004c,\n\tEditor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tKeywords = {scientific cognition},\n\tPublisher = {Journal of Cognition and Culture 4 (3-4): Thematic issues},\n\tTitle = {{Studies in Cognitive Anthropology of Science}},\n\tYear = {2004}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Rethinking interdisciplinarity. Emergent issues.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.; and Origgi, G.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Origgi, G.; Heintz, C.; and Sperber, D., editor(s), Rethinking interdisciplinarity. Online conference., 2004. \n \n\n\n\n
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@inproceedings{Heintz2004a,\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe and Origgi, Gloria},\n\tBooktitle = {Rethinking interdisciplinarity. Online conference.},\n\tEditor = {Origgi, Gloria and Heintz, Christophe and Sperber, Dan},\n\tKeywords = {scientific cognition},\n\tTitle = {{Rethinking interdisciplinarity. Emergent issues}},\n\turl_pdf={https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291523252_Rethinking_interdisciplinarity_Emergent_issues#fullTextFileContent},\n\tYear = {2004}}\n\n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Introduction: Why There Should Be a Cognitive Anthropology of Science.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Cognition and Culture,, 4(3-4): 391-408. 2004.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Heintz2004,\n\tAbstract = {I argue that questions, methods and theories drawn from cognitive anthropology are particularly appropriate for the study of science. I also emphasize the role of cognitive anthropology of science for the integration of cognitive and social studies of science. Finally, I briefly introduce the papers and attempt to draw the main directions of research.},\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tDoi = {10.1163/1568537042484922},\n\tJournal = {Journal of Cognition and Culture,},\n\tKeywords = {scientific cognition},\n\tNumber = {3-4},\n\tPages = {391-408},\n\tPublisher = {BRILL},\n\tTitle = {{Introduction: Why There Should Be a Cognitive Anthropology of Science}},\n\tVolume = {4},\n\tYear = {2004}}\n\n

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\n \n 2003\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n On Sousa's Epidemiological Approach.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C\n\n\n \n\n\n\n Journal of Cognition and Culture, 3(4): 322-328. 2003.\n \n\n\n\n
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@article{Heintz2003,\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, C},\n\tJournal = {Journal of Cognition and Culture},\n\tKeywords = {scientific cognition, cultural evolution},\n\tTitle = {{On Sousa's Epidemiological Approach}},\n\tnumber = {4},\n\tpages = {322-328},\n\tvolume = {3},\n\tdoi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156853703771818064},\n\tUrl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/heintz_epidemioOfSc.pdf},\n\tYear = {2003}}\n\n\n\n\n

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\n \n 2002\n \n \n (1)\n \n \n

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\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n Can mathematical concepts allow cultural analysis: An illustration.\n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Goggin, J.; and Loontjes, J., editor(s), Travelling Concept II: Frame, Meaning and Metaphor. Amsterdam: ASCA Press, 2002.\n \n\n\n\n
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@incollection{Heintz2002a,\n\tAuthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\tBooktitle = {Travelling Concept II: Frame, Meaning and Metaphor},\n\tEditor = {Goggin, J. and Loontjes, J.},\n\tKeywords = {scientific cognition},\n\tPublisher = {Amsterdam: ASCA Press},\n\tTitle = {{Can mathematical concepts allow cultural analysis: An illustration}},\n\tYear = {2002}}\n\n

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